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1 Introduction
This paper develops a model of credit, labor, and goods market frictions introduced in a symmet-
rical way, with matching functions associating, respectively, job seekers and vacancies, financial
institutions and “projects,” and “selling firms” and “customers.” The model is kept tractable under
a set of assumptions that can easily be removed to incorporate additional features. In particular,
this article introduces a structure of search in the goods market and its relation to income that
facilitates the exposition of the main concepts and, importantly, implies a convenient recursive
structure of the model. As a result, solutions in each market are derived sequentially with equi-
librium tightness in the goods market determined first. This leads to transparent and closed-form
solutions characterizing a labor market equilibrium, extending the canonical search models. This
also allows for a transparent calibration to several European economies, determining the role of
entry costs in each of the three markets, the respective role of price and wage markups, and finally
the role of complementarities between frictions in each market.
A classical search literature originally introduced economies with goods market frictions, where
consumers needed to prospect in the goods market in order to consume (e.g., Diamond, 1971,
1982). Diamond (1982) assumed that two consumers were needed to consume indivisible units of
goods (the coconuts). Diamond (1971) instead assumed two sides in the market, consumers and
sellers. Only consumers searched for diﬀerent shops. Shops were located in diﬀerent places. The
striking result of Diamond (1971) was that prices would converge to the monopsony price even
with infinitely small search costs.
A recent and growing literature has revived these ideas. A similar logic where consumers
and sellers are linked through a matching function in the goods market has been introduced in
Wasmer (2009), Lehmann and Van der Linden (2010), Bai et al. (2011), Michaillat and Saez
(2014) and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015). In this paper, we encompass these approaches
and assume that firms have imperfect access to financial markets, then imperfect access to the
labor market, and finally imperfect access to consumers. Consumers themselves face frictions to
consume certain goods and must spend time and resources to access these search goods. As long as
they are unsuccessful, they have excess income, which they spend on a non-frictional goodplaying
the role of a numeraire. This convenient assumption of a numeraire absorbing the excess liquidity
when agents do not access the search good is reminiscent of the night-and-day markets in the
search and money literature (Lagos and Wright, 2005 and Nosal and Rocheteau (2011)). When
the frictionless market opens in these models, any excess liquidity is absorbed so that agents start
the next day being ex ante identical. This has been a decisive step to simplify quite substantially
the rich money-search literature and develop its application in a large number of domains.
Although in this paper we focus on steady-state relations between markets, interesting cyclical
properties have been studied in the goods market, and in particular in relation to the cyclical
properties of intensive search margins (consumer search eﬀort and shopping time, advertising
eﬀorts by firms). Procyclicality of goods market search eﬀort has been established in Hall (2012)
for advertising. Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2015) provide an empirical test of the procyclicality of
search eﬀort by consumers. Their conclusions stand in contrast to Kaplan and Menzio (2013),
who argue instead that consumer search eﬀort is larger in recessions. The implications for fiscal
policy in the face of procyclical disposable income, and the underlying question of fiscal multipliers,
has been explored in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2014). In Bethune et al. (2015), drops in
demand from credit constrained consumers aﬀect the labor market through a search frictional
goods market in which firms’ marginal revenue declines with the level of demand faced in the
goods market. Thismechanism also appears in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015).
Section 2 first introduces search in the goods market and emphasizes the several important
diﬀerences from classical economies, including labor search economies, that need to be clarified.
2
The general equilibrium properties of the model are derived in the steady state in Section 3. Price
and wage bargaining solutions are explored in Section 4. We quantify the role of each friction and
the various complementarities between markets in three diﬀerent European economies in Section
5. Section 6 concludes.
2 A model with search in goods markets
2.1 Setup
Time is continuous. Consumers have access to two types of goods: (i) one type of good is accessible
with no frictions, indexed by 0, can be thought of as a set of inferior goods (food, basic services,
standard goods), and its price is normalized to unity; (ii) the other type of good, indexed by 1,
is subject to search frictions, and can either be interpreted as services or the flow consumption of
a durable good such as cars, housing service, etc. This second good is produced by firms, while
goods 0 will be produced by consumers, as discussed below.1
Hence, goods 0 are the goods regularly consumed without the need to search for them. Instead,
goods 1 represent goods needing new search from time to time, due to both the arrival on the
market of new consumption goods (e.g., a new restaurant in the neighborhood, a new brand of
consumption good), or replacement of old goods previously consumed and hit by various shocks,
specified below, such as changes in “consumer tastes” or the inability of firms to produce the good
for a period of time.
2.2 The life cycle of a new good
A new search good can be produced through the following sequence. First, the firm develops a
new project. The firm can be either an entirely new firm or an existing firm. In the latter case,
this is the marginal project of that firm. This project has to be financed externally. Hence, in this
early stage denoted by c, the firm attempts to form a first match with a financial intermediary.
The intermediary and the “project” subsequently form a block that is called a “firm.” However,
this match can break down from time to time following exogenous events, dissolving the match in
the financial market. Second, this newly formed block recruits a worker in a stage denoted by v
according to the standard labor matching process. Third, once the worker is recruited, the firm
is able to produce and advertise to sell its good, and begins to search actively for a consumer.
However, the firm does not generate profits yet. In the third phase of the life cycle of a firm,
“search in the goods market” indicated by subscript g, the firm makes no revenue and incurs losses
due to wage payments and operating costs. This stage precedes the final profit stage called stage
π, in which it can sell to consumers and generate profits. Figure 1 summarizes the timing and
notation of the various transitions between the diﬀerent stages.
In the special case of the absence of search frictions in the goods market, stages g and π are
confounded. In that limiting case, stage g lasts an infinitely small amount of time. Instead, with
a period of a positive length in stage g, the firm has to pay the wage to its worker, denoted by
wg. In stage π, after meeting with a consumer, the firm will obtain a price per period from the
1A convenient intuition to think of the diﬀerences between the two goods is to think of the two main sources of
heterogeneity across goods: spatial (similar goods are sold in diﬀerent places), and horizontal (some diﬀerentiation
across products). Both types of heterogeneity lead to higher search frictions. Goods 0 are goods for which search
is small, because they are sold in places known to the consumers and the degree of diﬀerentiation is low enough, or
because the consumer has kept a record of their location and characteristics. Goods 1 are goods for which, either
locations must be found or characteristics must be investigated. Once consumed, though, they are not subject to
search frictions, until the consumption match dissolves.
3
Figure 1: Timing and transition rates of a marginal project producing the search good: credit
destruction sCk, k = c, g,π, labor turnover sLk, k = g,π and taste shocks τ ; credit matching rate
p(φ), labor hiring rate q(θ) and goods market matching rate λ(ξ).
consumer P who will purchase the flow of service of the goods, as a long-term relationship. This
assumption characterizes the existence of specificity in the match formed in the goods market.
The firm pays a wage wπ.
2.3 Random matching in labor and credit
As in Wasmer and Weil (2004), denote by p the rate at which the project meets the creditor,
and by pˇ the rate at which the creditor meets — and implicitly both screens and accepts —
the project. There is an identity in the financial market between the total number of matches,
MC , the number of matched projects and the number of matched creditors in a unit of time:
MC = pNc = pˇBc. The ratio of project to creditors searching in the credit market, φ = Nc/Bc,
is a measure of conditions in the financial market called financial market tightness, and pˇ = φp.
Matching is governed by a constant returns to scale function with the mass of investment projects
and creditors searching in the financial market as arguments:
MC(Nc,Bc) with ∂ logMC/∂ logBc = ηC(φ) (1)
where ηC(φ) is the elasticity of matching in the financial market with respect to searching invest-
ment projects. The transition rates for investment projects and creditors are functions of credit
market tightness with p′(φ) < 0 and pˇ′(φ) > 0.
Similarly, following the macro-labor literature and Pissarides (2000), we assume the existence
of a constant returns to scale matching function in the labor market:
ML =ML(V,U) with ∂ logML/∂ log U = ηL(θ) (2)
where θ = V/U is a measure of labor market tightness and ηL(θ) is the elasticity of matching
with respect to unemployment. We denote by f(θ) the per-unit of time rate at which unemployed
workers find a job equal to ML/U , and q(θ) =ML/V the corresponding hiring rate on the firm’s
perspective. We have f(θ) ≡ θ.q(θ) and q′(θ) ≤ 0.
2.4 Goods market
We denote, respectively, by DM and DU the number of consumers matched with goods 1 or un-
matched. We also denote by Nπ and Ng the number of selling and searching firms (for consumers),
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respectively. The total number of employed workers is therefore equal to the total number of firms
in each stage, that is:
1− U = Nπ +Ng.
We also assume that each firm can serve only one consumer. This further implies:
DM ≡ Nπ.
This is therefore a one-firm/one-worker/one-consumer model.
As in the standard search and matching models, we introduce the tightness of the goods market
as:
ξ =
DU
Ng . (3)
It follows that the transition rates for firms and for consumers are given, respectively, by:
MG(DU ,Ng)
Ng = λ(ξ) with dλ/dξ > 0 (4)
MG(DU ,Ng)
DU = λ(ξ)/ξ = λˇ(ξ) with dλˇ/dξ < 0. (5)
The total number of prospective consumers, that is the consumers willing to exert search eﬀort
on the goods market to be able to consume search good 1, has to be determined. We assume that
only employed workers, who have access to a full salary can consume search good 1. That is, we are
assuming that all income available to the unemployed is spent on essential goods. The unemployed
have no additional disposable income to spend on the search good. In this simplified economy
with two goods, one (goods 0) is the essential good while the other one (goods 1) is a normal good
and, in the current case, even a luxury good not accessible to the unemployed. It follows that the
sum of unmatched and matched consumers of goods 1 sums up to total employment:
DU +DM = 1− U .
2.5 Match destruction
Labor relations in stage g and π dissolve at an exogenous Poisson rate sLk, with k = g,π. Credit
relations in stage v, g and π dissolve at an exogenous Poisson rate sCk, with k = c, g,π. Although
in the calibration exercise these diﬀerences in separation rates across stages will not be very
important, distinguishing them will have the virtue of following carefully the role of each parameter
in the single free-entry equation condensing all the margins of the model exposed in next Section.
In addition, we denote by sLg,π and sCg,π the average of these shocks across stages g and π:
sLg,π =
(NgsLg +NπsLπ) / (Ng +Nπ) and sCg,π = (NgsCg +NπsCπ) / (Ng +Nπ).
Consumer relations also dissolve, for two main reasons. First, the consumer of goods 1 may
change tastes, leading to a separation in the consumer-seller relationship. Such a separation event
arrives with Poisson intensity τ . Second, consumers, who are also workers, may face an income
shock due to job separation from turnover in either the labor or credit market terminating their
employment. The loss of purchasing power arrives on average at rate sLg,π + sCg,π depending on
whether the consumer is in a firm at stage g or π. This is unobserved by the selling firm. It
follows that the rate of consumption-match termination sG is the sum of the pure taste shock the
consumer income shocks. We use the compact notation sG = τ + sLg,π + sCg,π.
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2.6 Additional notations and concepts
Unused production capacities
There are unused resources at the firm level. Firms have the ability to produce, but not necessarily
to sell unless they find a consumer. Production takes place only when the match with the consumer
has been formed. Therefore, the firm does not use its capacity to produce in the stage where it
has no consumer. The search frictions in the goods market introduce a new concept, the rate of
capacity utilization. This can be defined as:
µG =
Nπ
Nπ +Ng . (6)
The rate of capacity utilization is the ratio of firms matched with a consumer, Nπ, to the total
number of firms matched with a worker who could, potentially, produce, Nπ +Ng = N . This rate
is a widely available statistic and will be used subsequently for calibrating the frictional economy.
Transfers, Lucas trees, and the circular flows of income in the economy
The firm receives a unit price P from consumers in exchange for x units of goods 1 produced. The
good produced is assumed to be indivisible: it must be fully consumed by the consumer. Here, x
must therefore be interpreted as quality of the good, entering the utility function of the consumer.
The consumer must, in addition, have the resources at the time of the meeting with the firm to
pay for the price P. No credit is allowed to customers, unlike Bethune et al. (2015) and Branch
et al. (2015) in which there is consumer credit.
At each point in time there is a mass µG(1 − U) = µGN of firms in stage π that is both
producing and selling goods 1. In the aggregate, firms generate gross revenues µGNPx, and have
total wage and search costs [µGwπ + (1− µG)wg]N + γV. A fraction µG of firms, those in a
goods market match, pay the wage wπ, while the other firms pay the wage wg. The diﬀerence
between gross revenue and costs, the net revenues generated by firms in this economy, is rebated
to unemployed workers as well as employed workers in equal shares. Denote by KU and KW the
dividends received by, respectively, the unemployed and employed, in the aggregate.
Importantly, workers receive additional resources expressed in terms of the numeraire good 0,
that are the fruits (in numeraire) of a Lucas tree growing in their individual garden. Each agent is
endowed in each unit of time a quantity y¯0 of additional resources. Hence, total disposable income
of employed workers is now:
(
µGPx+ y¯0
)N − γV −KU ≶ µGNPx. (7)
In the absence of the Lucas tree (y¯0 = 0), and given the discussion above, consumers’ aggregate
net income is below the value of sales of goods 1 NπPx.2
2Under low values of y¯0, consumers would be unable to purchase the search good. A non degenerate equilibrium
thus requires a positive and large enough value of y¯0 so that a non trivial equilibrium exists. As evident from
equation (7), this endowment must be greater than the sum of labor search costs and the share of dividends
accruing to the unemployed, γV +KU .
6
Utility, individual and aggregate consumption
The utility function of consumers depends on the consumption of both goods 1 and 0, and of
leisure denoted by l. It is denoted by v(c1, c0, l) where the first input is consumption of the
search good, the second of the numeraire, and the third leisure. We denote by c0U and c
0
M the
consumption of the numeraire by, respectively, the employed unmatched with a search good and
employed matched with a search good. We normalize leisure so that employed workers consume
no leisure and unemployed workers may consume up to a fixed quantity of leisure denoted by z.
Unmatched consumers are employed and therefore have no leisure, and a flow utility v(0, c0U , 0).
Matched consumers have a flow utility v(x, c0M , 0).
The viability of the search economy requires that consumers prefer the frictional good to the
numeraire, otherwise they would not search for good 1. The equilibrium must therefore be such
that:
v(x, c0M ) > v(0, c
0
U ).
The unemployed can freely transform part or all their leisure endowment z into additional
production of the numeraire, which insures an equilibrium between demand and supply of the
numeraire. Since the exact quantity of leisure transformed is irrelevant to the market equilibrium,
we only report these calculations in Appendix A.
3 Steady-state free-entry equilibrium
3.1 Bellman equations and free-entry
We are now able to introduce the main Bellman equations of the recursive structure of the model.
Upon the realization of any of the two separation shocks sLk, k = g,π, the firm returns to the
vacancy stage Jv in the entry equilibrium. Similarly, under the realization of one of the three
separation shocks sCk , k = v, g,π, the firm returns to the credit stage. Figure 1 summarizes the
timing of the various transitions.
Let Ec, Ev, Eg, and Eπ be the respective steady-state asset values of an entrepreneur in each
period (credit stage, labor stage, goods stage, profit). Let Bc, Bv, Bg, and Bπ be the respective
steady-state asset values of a bank in each period (credit stage, labor stage, goods stage, profit).
The corresponding equations are in Appendix B. Under the assumption of free-entry, that is,
each marginal project can enter the credit-stage freely, one has Bc = 0 and Ec = 0. Denote by
Jv, Jg and Jπ the firm value, that is of Ek + Bk, k = v, g,π the block formed by the “project”
in diﬀerent stages and the financial intermediary. We impose a free-entry condition in the credit
market: Ec = 0, Bc = 0 as in Wasmer and Weil (2004).
We define K(φ) as a measure of the total expected cost of financial intermediation, as the sum
of expected cost of firms searching for a bank and of the expected cost of the bank searching for
a suitable project to finance, that is,
K(φ) =
κB
φp(φ)
+
κI
p(φ)
.
Under free-entry, one has:
(r + sCv)Jv = (r + s
Cv)K = −γ + q(θ) (Jg − Jv) (8)
(r + sCg)Jg = −wg + sLg (Jv − Jg) + λ (Jπ − Jg) (9)
(r + sCπ)Jπ = xP − wπ + sLπ (Jv − Jπ) + sG (Jg − Jπ) . (10)
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All the model can therefore be collapsed into a single equation linking entry costs and future
expected profits, in combining the recursive equations above and eliminating the value functions.
We have (see Appendix B for a proof):
(
1 +
r + sCv
q
)
K +
γ
q(θ)
+
1
1−QπQg
(
wg − sLgK
r + sLg + sCg + λ
)
=
Qg
1−QπQg
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
r + sLπ + sCπ + sG
)
(11)
Entry Costs in Credit, Labor and Goods Markets Present Discounted Value of profits
with
Qg =
λ
r + sLg + sCg + λ
; Qπ =
sG
r + sLπ + sCπ + sG
.
The left-hand side is the sum of three terms, expressed in future value of the vacancy stage.
The first term is the future value of financial costs, the second term is the value of hiring costs,
the third term is the value of wages net of the recovery costs K after labor turnover in stage
g. The right-hand side is the expected discounted value of profits and recovery cost after labor
turnover in stage π. We will extensively study this equation and in particular calculate its diﬀerent
components in the quantitative exercise. The expression has various limiting cases capturing the
intuition of the decomposition above.
CL model with perfect goods market: λ→ +∞, Qg → 1
In this limit case, one obtains that the entry costs due to financial markets and the hiring costs
in the labor market add up and must be equal to the present-discounted value of profits:
(
1 +
r + sCv
q
)
K +
γ
q
=
xP − wπ + sLπK
r + sLπ + sCπ
. (12)
LG model with perfect credit markets: K → 0
In this limit case, one obtains that entry costs are the sum of hiring costs and deficits of the firm
when it does not sell, and they are equal to the properly discounted sum of profits in stage π.
Note that credit shocks sC (whereby the firm is back to the entry stage Ec = 0) could further
be eliminated, but the absence of credit market imperfection does not imply the absence of such
destructive shocks:
γ
q
+ 11−QπQg
(
wg
r+sLg+sCg+λ
)
=
Qg
1−QπQg
(
xP − wπ
r + sLπ + sCπ + sG
)
. (13)
L model with both perfect credit and goods market: K → 0 and λ→ +∞, Qg → 1
In this limit, one reverts to the standard Pissarides equation where entry costs are equal to future
discounted profits:
γ
q
=
xP − wπ
r + sLπ + sCπ
. (14)
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3.2 Steady-state solutions for goods and credit market tightness
Going back to the general case of frictions in three markets, the model is solved recursively.
The first step is to derive equilibrium goods market tightness. This is easy from the steady-
state equations governing the evolution of the various stocks of: (i) employment in goods market
matched firms; (ii) employment in unmatched firms in the goods market; (iii) unemployment; (iv)
vacancies; (v) matched consumers; and (vi) unmatched consumers. The equations for the stocks
are (see Appendix C for more details):
Nπ +Ng =
[
1 + λ/(sLg,π + sG)
]Ng (15)
DM +DU =
[
1 + λˇ/(sLg,π + sG)
]DU (16)(
λ+ sLg,π
)Ng = NπsG +ML(U ,V) (17)
ML(U ,V) = sLg,π(1− U) (18)
Ng +Nπ = 1− U (19)
DU +DM = 1− U . (20)
One can therefore solve the six stock variables with the six equations above. Goods market
tightness is the ratio of firms willing to sell to prospective consumers. Using the ratio of equations
(15) and (16) on the one hand, and along with the fact that Ng +Nπ = DU +DM from equations
(19) and (20), we have that:
Ng +Nπ
DM +DU =
1 + λ/(sLg,π + sG)
1 + λˇ/(sLg,π + sG)
Ng
DU = 1. (21)
Property 1 (steady-state goods market tightness). Consumption tightness ξ in a steady state
is equal to 1 if only the employed workers have access to the frictional good:
DU +DM = N ⇒ ξ∗ = 1. (22)
The proof amounts to solving a fixed point problem:
ξ =
1 + λ(ξ)/(sLg,π + sG)
1 + λˇ(ξ)/(sLg,π + sG)
. (23)
Using λˇ(ξ) = λ(ξ)/ξ , it is easy to see that ξ = 1 is one such fixed point. It can be shown
that, under an Inada condition on the matching function, there is a second fixed point ξ = 0
corresponding to a degenerate case with no market. This would be a subsistence economy where
everyone consumes the numeraire in quantity y¯0. There is no other fixed point for a standard
matching function. When ξ > 0, one has ξ + λ(ξ)/(sLg,π + sG) = 1 + λ(ξ)/(sLg,π + sG), which
leads immediately to ξ = 1.3 This property determines not only goods market tightness, but also
the value of transition rates in the goods market. Hence, from now on, we have λˇ(1) = λ(1) = λ.
3This result, when the ratio (Ng +Nπ) / (DM +DU ) is equal to 1, arises from the apparently innocuous as-
sumption that only the employed workers search for the search good. It can be interpreted as a stochastic version
of the old Say’s law that demand equals supply. The firm produces one good, each consumer consumes one good,
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In regards to the repayment ψ from the firm to the creditor in stage π, it is the solution to the
following conventional Nash bargaining game:
ψ = argmax(Bv −Bc)αC (Ev − Ec)1−αC
where αC ∈ (0, 1) is the relative bargaining strength of the creditor. The solution to this problem
depends on the assumed eﬀect of the repayment ψ on the wage to labor w. Under the assumption
that, from the perspective of bargaining in the financial market, the future wage w paid to the
worker does not depend on the repayment ψ, the slopes of the value of the profit stage for both the
creditor and the project are equal in absolute value. That is, ∂Bπ/∂ψ = −∂Eπ/∂ψ = 1/(r + sT )
where sT = sG + sLπ + sCπ.
It then follows that the absolute value of slopes for the asset values of the labor search stage
are also equal: ∂Bv/∂ψ = −∂Ev/∂ψ = QL × 1/(r + sT ). The Nash sharing rule for Ψ can thus
be written as:
(1− αC) (Bv −Bc) = αC (Ev − Ec) . (24)
The sharing rules can be rearranged as: Bv = αCJv and Ev = (1 − αC)Jv , which states that
the creditor receives a share αC of the match surplus Jv, while a share (1− αC) accrues to the
project. Recall that free entry in the financial market leads to values of the labor search stage
Bv = κB/ (φp(φ)) and Ev = κI/p(φ).
Property 2 (steady-state credit market tightness). Combining the above equations with the
equation for Nash bargaining over the repayment (24) one reaches a unique solution for financial
market tightness, φ∗ and repayment ψ :
φ∗ =
κB
κI
1− αC
αC
(25)
ψ
r + sT
= αC
xP − wπ
r + sT
+ (1− αC)
(
1−QgQπ
Qg
· γ
q(θ)
+
wg
λ
)
(26)
Equilibrium financial market tightness, represented in equation (25), is increasing in the ratio
of search costs for creditor κB to the flow search costs for investment project κI . An increase
in κB leads to fewer creditors searching in the market and hence a longer duration of search for
projects. In contrast, if the creditor receives a larger share of the credit match surplus, and thus
a larger share of the value of a job opening and the profit flows during production, the free entry
equilibrium will have a lower tightness of the financial market. This second property was proved
in Wasmer and Weil (2004). The present discounted value of the repayment to the creditor during
the profit stage, ψ/(r+ sT ), is an αC weighted average of future profits of streams to the creditor-
project match, (xP − wπ) /
(
r + sT
)
, and their past search costs in the labor and goods market.
Under perfect goods market, λ→∞ and Qg = 1 ; Qπ = 0. In this case, the second term converges
to γ/q(θ).
The model is now partially solved since the first two blocks, financial and goods market tight-
nesses are fully determined. Price and wages now remain to be solved for, which is done next.
and each firm employs one employee-consumer. If instead each firm employed, say, two workers, this would lead
to the creation of two consumers and thus goods market tightness would be equal to 2, in the steady state. If
conversely, each firm produced two units of goods, each worker-consumer would be able to consume two units of
goods (in another firm) and therefore goods market tightness would be equal to half unity. Adapting this logic,
if each firm could produce nq units and employed nw workers, the steady-state goods market tightness would be
equal to nw/nq . Nonetheless, goods market tightness would still be a constant of parameters.
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4 Bargaining relations in labor and goods market
Before solving for wages, one can first simplify the structure of the model. Having diﬀerent
turnover rates by stage of the firm led to transparent interpretations of the various parameters
in the entry equation (11). From now on, we can however simplify the turnover structure of the
model and assume sLg = sLπ = sL and sCv = sCg = sCπ = sC ; we thus have:
rJv = −γ + q(Jg − Jv) + sC(Jc − Jv) (27)
rJg = −wg + λ(Jπ − Jg) + sC(Jc − Jg) + sL(Jv − Jg) (28)
rJπ = xP − wπ + sC(Jc − Jπ) + sG(Jg − Jπ) + sL(Jv − Jπ). (29)
At each step, the existence of search frictions creates rents and those rents are conveniently
split by Nash-bargaining. Nash-bargaining is commonly applied in the literature and this allows
for easier comparability. We first start with a simple sequence of events where labor and goods
lead to bilateral negotiations in each market, with shares of the firm/project being respectively
1−αL; 1−αG, that is, shares of the worker and consumer αL;αG. To simplify the exposition, we
will first start with a perfect credit market and generalize the model just after. That is, subsections
4.1 and 4.2 present first the solution with no credit frictions (K = 0) and then extend it easily to
the case K > 0. The Appendix also derives the full case with K > 0 and diﬀerent turnover rates
across stages of the firm.
4.1 Price determination under perfect financial markets
Consumer-producer relationships are costly to create as they require several steps with direct costs
(search) and have related opportunity costs. It is therefore natural to adopt a price determination
rule that is the outcome of bargaining between the firm and the consumer. In what follows, on
price and wage determination, we assume that bargaining takes places at the time of the meeting.
In addition, we make the simplifying assumption that workers are paid the same wage w
whether or not their employer is matched with a consumption. This implies that wg = wπ = w,
an assumption which greatly simplifies the analysis without being central to the main results.
Rigidities, in the spirit of Gertler and Trigari (2009) can justify this assumption. Alternatively,
this equality of wages would arise in the presence of collective bargaining between workers and
firms. Additional alternative assumptions are discussed in the concluding Section, and they do
not qualitatively alter the main results. Diﬀerent wages and alternative timing are fully explored
in the Appendix.
A newly employed worker is by definition a consumer not yet matched with a product in the
goods market. Its present discounted utility is denoted by Wn0. After a period of random search,
(s)he reaches the consumption stage 1 in which (s)he consumes the frictional good. The present
discounted utility in this stage is denoted by Wn1. At any time, the consumer may be hit by a
labor turnover shock, would move to unemployment and would have a present discounted utility
Wu. This arises with probability per unit of time sL. Finally, a matched consumer may exit the
consumption match but remain employed if a goods match termination shock occurs. These arrive
at rate sG, which includes both the taste shock τ , and the possible disruption of production due
to the risk of labor turnover sL. In both cases the consumer returns to the goods market search
stage with asset value, Wn0.
The Bellman equations of consumers, using the earlier result that λˇ(1) = λ(1) = λ in a
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stationary equilibrium, are:
rWn0 = v(0, y¯
0 + w, 0) + λ(Wn1 −Wn0) + sL(Wu −Wn0) (30)
rWn1 = v(x, y¯
0 + w − Px, 0) + sL(Wu −Wn1) + sG(Wn0 −Wn1) (31)
rWu = v(0, y¯
0, z) + f(θ)(Wn0 −Wu) (32)
where the last equation is based on the fact that the unemployed have an additional z units
of leisure. The surplus of the consumer, Wn1 − Wn0, is the diﬀerence in its valuation of the
consumption stage and the search stage. Subtracting (30) from (31) we have the consumer’s
surplus as Wn1 −Wn0 = v(x,y¯
0+w−Px)−v(0,y¯0+w)
r+sL+sG+λ
. The main results are clear under a linear utility
setup. While richer dynamics require some concavity in utility v with respect to goods 0, the
exposition of the main concepts of the LG model can accommodate a linear utility. Assume that
v(x, c0) = Φx+ c0+ l, where the marginal utility of goods 0 is 1 (hence it is a numeraire), and the
marginal utility of goods 1 is Φ > 1. A non degenerate equilibrium will therefore require Φ > P.
Under these preferences we obtain a simpler expression for the the consumer’s surplus :
Wn1 −Wn0 = Φx− Pxr + sL + sG + λ .
The production of goods 0 has disappeared from the consumption surplus due to the assumption
of linearity. The surplus from a goods market match is the discounted present value of flow net
utility from consumption of the search good (Φ − P)x. In a Walrasian market, for comparison,
the price is the marginal utility of consumption of the good, and the consumer surplus is driven
to zero at the equilibrium price.
In this search frictional goods market, prices are bargained and set according to a Nash-sharing
rule. The price is the solution to
P = argmax (Wn1 −Wn0)αG (Jπ − Jg)1−αG (33)
where αG ∈ (0, 1) is the consumer’s bargaining weight. The price must therefore satisfy the share
rule Wn1 −Wn0 = αG1−αG (Jπ − Jg). The firm’s surplus with respect to the consumer relation is,
subtracting (28) from (29): Jπ − Jg = Px−wπ+wgr+sL+sG+λ .
If we make the earlier simplifying assumption that wg = wπ, the wage cancels out of the surplus
of the firm. Combining the definitions on the consumer and firms goods market surplus with the
Nash share rule leads to the bargained price:
Px = (1− αG)Φx. (34)
The price depends on the marginal utility for the good, Φ, and the relative bargaining power of the
seller (1− αG). The property that the price is a function of consumer preferences and bargaining
parameters is a general one. It also arises when the wage is allowed to vary across stages g and π.
4.2 Wage determination under perfect financial markets
We make the assumption of an identical wage w at idle firms (stage g) and selling firms (stage
π). The wage is negotiated when the firm is in the goods market stage g. As we saw in the
previous section, this assumption on wage implies that the wage does not aﬀect the capital gain
from a match in the goods market for either the consumer or the firm. The wage drops out of the
expression of a match surplus for both the consumer and the firm.
The bargained wage is the outcome of
w = argmax (Jg − Jv) 1−αL (Wn0 −Wu) αL
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leading to the labor match surplus sharing rule: (1− αL) (Wn0 −Wu) = αL (Jg − Jv). Using the
definition of the asset values, the wage can be expressed as a function of the firm’s surplus with
respect to the consumer:
w = (1− αL)(rWu − y¯0) +
(
αL − αG
1− αG
)
λ(Jπ − Jg)
and then using the expression for the seller’s surplus in the previous subsection and the discounting
term Q′g = λ/(r + s
L + sG + λ), the wage in the labor market can be linked to the price in the
goods market:
w = (1− αL)z + αLγθ +
(
αL − αG
1− αG
)
Q′gPx. (35)
Again, simpler cases lead to the main intuitions. The Pissarides case is obtained when Q′g = 1
(frictions in the goods market disappear) and when the firm does not lose any surplus to consumers
(αG = 0): w = (1− αL)z + αL (γθ + Px).
In the general case, replacing Px by its equilibrium value, the wage equation simplifies further
to:
w = (1− αL)z + αLγθ + (αL − αG)Q′gΦx. (36)
The term (αL − αG)Q′gΦx can more easily be understood by rewriting it as −(1 − αL)Q′gΦx +
(1−αG)Q′gΦx. The first, negative term, is a worker threat point eﬀect: by having higher marginal
utility Φx from consuming the search good, the worker has more to lose from a breakdown in
negotiations as the unemployed lose access to the search good. The second one is a consumer
surplus eﬀect: the firm obtains a fraction (1−αG) of the marginal utility of the search good, and
this leads to a higher wage. Simplifying, one obtains an impact of Φx that is linear in αL − αG.
Note however that the value of αL − αG is always positive: if the bargaining power of consumers
were above that of workers, this would imply that the firm would give up more to the worker
than what it can expect from the sales, and the total surplus would be negative in stage g. In the
special case where the worker’s bargaining weight in the labor market is equal to the consumer’s
bargaining weight in the goods market, αL = αG, the consumption surplus for the firm and the
wage no longer depends on the price in the goods market or changes in the marginal revenue from
production.
Viability conditions insure that the decentralized equilibrium is not degenerate. The full con-
ditions are easily derived. To summarize these conditions, it is necessary for wages to fall into
the interval (xP − y0, xP) where y0 is the transfer of numeraire (income) in addition to the labor
income. This means that workers can pay for the goods in numeraire and the firm can pay workers
above the selling price. This condition is satisfied if the supply of numeraire y¯0 is large enough
compared to a combination of parameters involving αL and αG as well as x, z and θ. Another
condition is that the unemployed workers cannot consume the inelastic supply of the search good
x, which is the case when y¯0 < xP = (1− αG)Φx.
4.3 Prices and wages under imperfect credit markets
We now need to establish the setting of wages in order to determine equilibrium labor market
tightness.
The prices in all three markets, the repayment to the credit ψ, the wage to the worker w, and
the price for the good P, are derived in the same manner as in the earlier respective subsections.
The price equation remains a simple rule, as in the LG model, that is a function of the marginal
utility of the search good Φ:
Price: P = (1− αG)Φ. (37)
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Wages now incorporate the value of recoverable search costs in the financial markets, Jv =
K(φ). Assuming a wage rule where the wage remains constant in stages g and π, and is negotiated
in stage g to satisfy the Nash sharing rule:
(1− αL)(Wn0 −Wu) = αL(Jg − Jv)
one obtains a wage equation:
w = (1− αL)(rWu − y¯0)− αL(r + sC)K + αL − αG
1− αG Q
′
gxP (38)
where Q′g = λ/(r+ s
C + sL+ sG+λ). Again, the wage converges to CL wage when goods market
frictions disappear (λ→∞), to the wage in the LG model when financial frictions disappear (K →
0), and to the conventional Pissarides wage when both goods and financial frictions disappear.
5 A quantitative exploration of the role of complementarities be-
tween the three markets
We propose in this section to calibrate the CLG model for three European economies that display
strong structural diﬀerences in terms of the three markets at stake: the United Kingdom, Germany,
and Spain. We use data mainly provided by Eurostat which will be described in subsection 5.1.
For each country, we run a first calibration targeting 2005 data. Based on the results, some
structural parameters are fixed and a second calibration is run with 2014 targets. This allows for
a comparison between the three economies at two diﬀerent points in time, before and after the
peak of the financial crisis.
The results obtained will then be used to proceed to diﬀerent numerical exercises, as described
in subsection 5.2. First, we can quantify the relative weight of each type of friction in firms’ entry
decision in the three countries studied. The model also allows us to analyze the interdependence
of the credit, labor, and goods markets. We will in particular focus on the impact of each type of
friction on the unemployment rate.
5.1 Calibration strategy for three countries: Germany, UK, Spain
The time period is monthly. In each of the frictional markets, we assume matching functions such
that: p(φ) = χC/
√
φ, q(θ) = χL/
√
θ, and λ(ξ) = χG
√
ξ = χG. Table 1 summarizes the targets
used for the calibration. Table 2 displays the resulting parameter values. We provide more details
on the calibration in Appendix G, and report the values of endogenous variables in Appendix
Table A.1 for completeness.
5.2 Exploring the role of frictions and their interactions
5.2.1 Decomposing the three components of entry costs
Going back to the entry equation, one has in the left-hand side three diﬀerent blocks, each of them
reflecting the intensity of the entry cost due to credit, labor, and goods markets:
(
1 +
r + sC
q
)
K +
γ
q
+ 11−QπQg
(
wg−sLK
r+sC+sL+λ
)
=
Qg
1−QπQg
(
xP − wπ + sLK
r + sT
)
(39)
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Table 1: Calibration targets: monthly frequency
Market Calibration target Model Year UK SPA GER
Credit
finance’s share in GDP Σ
2005 .024 .016 .018
2014 .025 .013 .014
credit matching rate p 2005 1/6 1/6 1/6
search for credit ratio κB/κI 2005 1 1 1
Labor
unemployment rate U
2005 .048 .092 .110
2014 .062 .245 .050
job finding rate f
2005 .164 .167 .064
2014 .128 .070 .103
job vacancy rate V
2005 .022 .008 .032
2014 .023 .006 .029
wages’ share in GDP Wgdp
2005 .578 .532 .551
2014 .567 .515 .567
ratio unemployment benefits over wages z/w 2005 .24 .46 .31
recruiting costs γV/w 2005 .036 .036 .036
Goods
ratio of capacity utilization µG
2005 .795 .803 .840
2014 .820 .757 .840
numeraire’s share in expenditures N
2005 .313 .336 .344
2014 .323 .374 .358
Table 2: Parameter values under monthly calibration
Parameters Year UK SPA GER
Fixed parameters
discount rate r both .0033 .0033 .0033
credit separation rate sC both .0028 .0034 .0011
bank’s bargaining weight αC both .5 .5 .5
productivity x both 1 1 1
quantity of numeraire y¯0 both 1/12 1/12 1/12
marginal utility of consumption Φ both 1.15 1.15 1.15
pure-taste shock rate τ both .01 .01 .01
Parameters calibrated credit matching factor χC both .17 .17 .17
to 2005 and then credit search eﬀort κI both .23 .29 .30
kept fixed for 2014 vacancy posting cost γ both .23 .55 .15
unemployment benefits z both .034 .056 .040
Calibrated parameters
project screening cost κB
2005 .23 .29 .30
2014 .22 .28 .10
job separation rate sL
2005 .005 .014 .007
2014 .006 .019 .004
labor matching factor χL
2005 .24 .57 .12
2014 .21 .46 .14
worker’s bargaining weight αL
2005 .88 .94 .94
2014 .90 .98 .90
goods matching factor χG
2005 .11 .18 .14
2014 .13 .18 .12
consumer’s bargaining power αG
2005 .82 .83 .84
2014 .83 .81 .85
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Table 3: Measuring the respective role of market frictions in each market: decomposition of the
three components of entry costs in 2014
Static decomposition of each block: Credit Labor Goods Sum
Share of entry costs due to each friction UK 51.6% 12.4% 36.0% 100%
in equation (39) Ger 41.9% 15.8% 42.3% 100%
Spa 80.4% 4.3% 15.3% 100%
Limit cases of an economy with only one friction: C model L model G model Sum
Size of entry costs in limiting cases relative to total UK 50.8% 14.5% 48.0% 113.3%
initial entry costs in equation (39) when χj ,χj′ → +∞ Ger 40.9% 18.0% 51.7% 110.7%
in pairs for for j, j′ = C,L,G, and j ̸= j′ Spa 80.3% 5.3% 36.3% 121.9%
Note: C (resp. L, G) model refers to an economy with only credit (respectively labor, goods) frictions
This equation also displays some interesting interaction eﬀects between frictions in separate mar-
kets. For instance, the degree of labor market frictions amplifies the marginal eﬀect of credit
frictions summarized in K. Indeed, the lower q is, the higher will be the eﬀect of K on total entry
costs, as the cost of credit from longer periods of search in the labor market will increase. Hence,
labor frictions impact both in the first term and in the second term of the entry side of the equa-
tion. Similarly, since entry wages are determined taking into account costs K, as in equation (38),
higher financial frictions K reduce future wages. This reduces entry costs associated with goods
market frictions (the third entry cost), and therefore leads to a partial substitutability between
goods and financial markets.
We can compute the relative weight of each of the three blocks in the total entry costs faced
by the firm as follows. In a purely accounting sense, one can attribute to each market the share
in costs due respectively to
(
1 + r+s
C
q
)
K, γq , and
1
1−QπQg
(
wg−sLK
r+sC+sL+λ
)
. This is illustrated in the
first part of Table 3, which reports the market friction’s share of total entry costs for each country
to which we have calibrated the model. By construction, the sum reaches 100%.
Another exercise gives a slightly similar conclusion but in a less mechanical sense. Indeed,
keeping all other parameters constant, the model can be solved in diﬀerent particular cases where
matching eﬃciency parameters χC , χL, or χG tend to infinity (i.e., the corresponding market
becomes frictionless). Along the way, the endogenous variables (wages, tightness, and transition
rates) also change, themselves aﬀecting the value of each component of the entry costs. For
instance, having χC and χL go simultaneously to infinity leaves only the entry costs due to the
initial deficit of firms trying to sell, and focuses on the role of goods market entry costs. Similarly,
having χL and χG go to infinity gives the role of the entry costs due to the credit frictions. In
each limiting case the value of the entry cost is compared to the total entry cost from its three
components of computed prior to removing the frictions (i.e., the total costs of equation (39))
. The results of this exercise are reported in the lower panel of Table 3. Note that now, by
construction, the sum of all columns cannot be 100%. It is actually larger than 100%.
Interestingly, the share of labor market costs is small compared to the share due to the other
frictions. In Spain especially, the labor block is of limited importance, while the financial block
captures most of the entry cost (just over 80%). This may be due to the fact that, in 2014, the
Spanish economy was more adversely aﬀected by the financial crisis which severely aﬀected banks.
The fact that the goods market block is higher in the second part of the table for all countries,
and especially Spain, comes from the fact that labor and credit frictions reduced wages overall.
Shutting them oﬀ leads to a higher entry wage, and therefore magnifies goods market frictions
relative to the benchmark case.
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5.2.2 Demand-side eﬀects: how consumer income shocks aﬀect entry and unemploy-
ment
Another exercise is to attempt to isolate the role of income shocks through the demand for search
goods by consumers. In equation (39), this can be seen by observing that in total separations
sT = sL + sC + sG = 2sL + 2sC + τ , the terms sC and sL arise twice. This is due to the fact
that the corresponding shocks, a separation in the credit market or the labor market, aﬀect profits
in two diﬀerent ways: once directly, as they capture the risk of labor turnover and credit market
shocks on the expected revenue of the firm itself; but also a second time indirectly, as these shocks
aﬀect consumers through their own firms, leading to a loss of income and the separation of the
consumption relation. To decompose the two eﬀects, it is useful to introduce a subscript, s, to the
turnover shocks for the supply’s direct eﬀect on firms. We refer to this as the “classical eﬀect.”
A demand side eﬀect arise through separations in indicate with the subscript d and summarize
in sG = τ + sLd + s
C
d . We refer to this as the “consumption eﬀect.” We thus have, with this new
notation:
sT = sLs + s
C
s + s
G = sLs + s
C
s + τ + s
L
d + s
C
d
The respective role of these two shocks on the firm and on its consumer’s income can be explored
as follows. First, one can calculate the rise in labor market tightness induced by doubling labor
and credit turnover shocks sLk , s
C
k , for both k = s, d, and keeping the rate of change in consumer
taste constant τ . The first column in Table 4 calculates the percentage change in labor market
tightness from these comparative static exercises. The eﬀect of increasing both turnover rates
simultaneously leads to a decrease of equilibrium labor market tightness. In the case of the UK this
is a 20.4% decline, 14.2% in Germany, and a larger 43.9% in Spain. The last two columns of Table
4 decompose the eﬀect with a part due to only the supply side, thus maintaining sG = sLd + s
C
d + τ
fixed, and the residual part where only sG would change. The classical eﬀect is responsible for the
largest share of the decline in labor market tightness, ranging between 70% and 85% depending
on the country. Nonetheless, the demand side eﬀect is a non-negligible component of the eﬀect of
turnover on labor market tightness. These reults provide an upper bound on the depressing eﬀect
of the lack of consumption sharing in this economy.
5.2.3 The respective role of each friction on unemployment
The model in steady state oﬀers comparative statics exercises for the respective role of diﬀerent
frictions. Investigating the impact of each friction separately or simultaneously is likely to deliver
diﬀerent outcomes because of potential complementarities between frictions. As said above, there
are both complementarity and substitutability across frictions.
To better understand the pattern of complementarity, we represent in Figure 2 the left-hand
side (costs) and the right-hand side (profits) of the entry equation, as a function of labor market
tightness, and double the eﬃciency of the three markets one by one. The solid lines are the entry
and profit curves in the benchmark economy. The dashed lines represent the same curve after a
doubling of the eﬃciency of each market separately, respectively credit, labor, and goods market
when going from left to right.
It can be seen that the greatest impact on curves is the eﬀect of a change in the eﬃciency of
credit market matching. This shifts entry down, as expected, since a 1% increase in χC reduces
K by the same amount, and these costs represent more than 50% of total entry costs. However,
the total eﬀect on labor market tightness is not large. This is because the higher eﬃciency of
matching in the credit market is partly oﬀset by lower future profits, due to higher wages and
a lower “recovery value” after labor separation. In contrast, changes in the eﬃciency of labor
markets reduces entry costs as well. This leads to larger increases in labor market tightness, with
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Table 4: Amplification eﬀects of supply shocks through their supplementary impact on consumer’s
income and demand for goods. Variation in labor market tightness when doubling the separation
rates sL and sC individually or in combination.
% change in θ Decomposition
when doubling labor Classical eﬀect Consumption eﬀect
and credit turnover in π Supply driven Demand driven
k = s, d k = s k = d
UK
sLk × 2 -11.6% 0.706 0.294
sCk × 2 -9.8% 0.821 0.179
sCk ,s
L
k × 2 -20.4% 0.772 0.228
Germany
sLk × 2 -10.2% 0.719 0.281
sCk × 2 -4.5% 0.825 0.175
sCk ,s
L
k × 2 -14.2% 0.758 0.242
Spain
sLk × 2 -36.1% 0.806 0.194
sCk × 2 -11.3% 0.853 0.147
sCk ,s
L
k × 2 -43.9% 0.830 0.170
Classical eﬀect: contribution of supply driven separations, keeping demand driven
separations sG = sLd + s
C
d + τ fixed. Consumption eﬀect: contribution of demand
driven separations, keeping supply driven separations sLs , s
C
s fixed.
no impact on the profit curve. Finally, an increase in the eﬃciency of goods market matching has
both a downward eﬀect on costs and an ambiguous eﬀect on profits as part of the eﬀect appears in
wages. However, the latter eﬀect is small and, overall, the main eﬀect is to increase labor market
tightness as well.
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Table 5: Percentage (log-variation) in θ from changes in matching eﬃciency
UK Germany Spain
% ∆χj , j = C,L,G: +10 +33 +50 +100 +10 +33 +50 +100 +10 +33 +50 +100
One parameter increases
∆θ
∆χC
8.6 7.9 7.5 6.6 7.0 6.4 6.0 5.3 7.6 6.9 6.6 5.8
∆θ
∆χL
9.3 8.4 8.0 7.0 8.5 7.7 7.3 6.4 30.5 27.8 26.3 23.1
∆θ
∆χG
20.1 18.6 17.7 15.7 17.3 15.9 15.2 13.5 30.5 28.3 27.0 24.1
Two parameters increase: complementarities
∆2θ
∆χC∆χL
-4.6 -4.0 -3.8 -3.3 -4.7 -3.6 -3.5 -3.1 -12.9 -11.9 -11.4 -10.1
∆2θ
∆χC∆χG
-4.6 -4.1 -3.9 -3.4 -3.4 -2.5 -2.3 -2.0 -12.8 -11.7 -11.0 -9.7
∆2θ
∆χL∆χG
-9.5 -8.8 -8.4 -7.5 -8.2 -7.6 -7.3 -6.5 -12.9 -12.0 -11.5 -10.3
Table 6: Unemployment rate eﬀect of increase in matching eﬃciency
Baseline rate UK: 6.2 Germany: 5.0 Spain: 24.5
[-0.075in]
% ∆χj +10 +33 +50 +100 +10 +33 +50 +100 +10 +33 +50 +100
j = C,L,G:
χC 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 24.4 24.3 24.2 24.1
χL 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.1 4.5 3.7 3.3 2.5 22.5 19.0 17.0 13.0
χG 6.1 6.0 6.0 5.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.7 24.2 23.7 23.5 22.9
χC , χL 5.6 4.6 4.1 3.0 4.5 3.7 3.3 2.4 22.4 18.8 16.8 12.8
χL, χG 5.6 4.5 4.0 3.0 4.5 3.7 3.2 2.4 22.2 18.4 16.3 12.1
χC , χG 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.7 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.7 24.1 23.5 23.2 22.6
χC , χL, χG 5.6 4.5 3.9 2.9 4.5 3.6 3.2 2.3 22.2 18.2 16.1 12.0
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Figure 2: Eﬀect of doubling each matching eﬃciency parameter χj, j = C,L,G on the entry costs curve and the profit curve as a function
of labor market tightness. Left charts: doubling credit matching eﬃciency; middle charts: doubling labor matching eﬃciency; right charts:
doubling goods matching eﬃciency.
20
Table 5 shows the eﬀects of varying matching eﬃciency on labor market tightness. The slope
of this eﬀect varies across countries, but a 10% increase in matching eﬃciency in credit market
raises tightness by 8.6% in the UK, 7% in Germany, and 7.6% in Spain (implying elasticities
of respectively 0.86, 0.7, and 0.76). Note that this eﬀect declines with the size of the eﬃciency
increase. Similarly, a 10% increase in matching eﬃciency in labor market raises tightness by 9.3%
in the UK, 8.5% in Germany, and a larger 30.5% in Spain (implying elasticities of respectively
0.93, 0.85, and 3.05). Finally, an increase in goods market eﬃciency generates an increase in labor
market tightness of 20.1%, 17.3%, and 30.5% (implying elasticities of respectively 2.01, 1.73, and
3.05). Larger elasticities correspond to the case of smaller total surplus (especially for Spain) and
the friction considered having a greater impact on that surplus; with small surpluses, the economy
is more volatile to shocks. Note also that cross-market eﬀects tend to attenuate each other: lower
frictions in one market reduce the marginal impact of reducing frictions in another market. This
eﬀect comes from the wage eﬀect of frictions. Higher eﬃciency of matching raises wages through
both lower K and higher θ, and the second order derivatives of θ to two frictions is negative. In
the case of fixed wages, one would have instead ∆
2θ
∆χC∆χL
= ∆
2θ
∆χG∆χL
= 0, while elasticities of labor
market tightness to eﬃciency of matching is typically 10 times higher, an eﬀect well known in the
literature following Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005).
Finally, and as expected from the graphics in Figure 2, the main eﬀect on unemployment
reported in Table 6 comes from reducing labor market frictions, despite the potentially larger
impact of credit market frictions: reducing credit market frictions pushes entry cost down on the
credit side, but the rise in wages mitigates this eﬀect and ex-post turns out to almost eliminate
the gains. In particular, in the UK, doubling the eﬃciency of goods and credit markets would
reduce the rate of unemployment by 3.1 percentage points. In Germany, the eﬀect would be 2.5
percentage points. In Spain the eﬀect would be 11.5 percentage points.
5.3 Robustness to variations in targets or in fixed parameters
The robustness of our results is tested in varying (over sometimes large ranges) the parameters
for which we either have no target in the data or uncertain targets.
Table 7 shows the decomposition of the three entry costs to, respectively from top to bottom,
a doubling or a division by ten of the share of finance (business sector) in GDP 4; a doubling or a
division by 2 of the relative costs of credit search of creditors relative to projects/firms; a doubling
or a division by 2 of the transition rate of projects/firms from search for credit to the labor stage;
a change of the bargaining power of creditors vis-à-vis the firm to 0.9 or 0.2 ; a doubling or a
division by 2 of the exogenous injections of Lucas fruits into the economy, and; finally a change in
the marginal utility of search goods by 10 or 20%. As is apparent, changes in the decomposition are
rarely important compared to the benchmark case. In some cases, they are even totally neutralized
in the entry equation by proportional comovements of the three components, as is the case for
instance in the last row for changes in the marginal utility of search goods, or in other rows, for
instance that on varying the duration of credit search 1/p. The same conclusion is reached when
replicating the decomposition exercise reported in the lower part of Table 3, consisting on letting
frictions disappear in individual markets two-by-two to recalculate these shares. See Table A.2 in
the Appendix for the detailed results.
4We had attributed half of the total finance share to the business sector, the other half being, in national accounts,
services to consumers. This is close to the division for U.S. data but not necessarily applicable to the countries
studied here. Note that reducing the value added of the financial sector relative to GDP raises the prospection
costs in the calibration when αC is fixed. Doing so reduces the profit margins of the financial sector, which in turn
raises the share of credit in total entry costs.
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Table 7: Robustness of the decomposition in terms of the share of entry costs
UK Germany Spain
Friction: C L G Sum C L G Sum C L G Sum
Benchmark 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.9 15.8 42.3 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
Finance’s share in GDP
Σ×2 45.9 13.2 40.9 100 34.4 17.4 48.2 100 78.1 4.8 17.2 100
Σ/10 56.6 11.5 31.9 100 47.5 14.5 38.0 100 82.7 3.8 13.5 100
Credit-search costs
κB = 2κI 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.9 15.8 42.3 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
κB = κI/2 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.8 15.8 42.4 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
Credit finding rate
p× 2 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.9 15.8 42.3 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
p/2 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.8 15.8 42.4 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
Creditor’s bargaining power
αC = 0.8 51.3 12.4 36.3 100 41.1 15.6 43.3 100 80.9 4.2 15.0 100
αC = 0.2 50.5 12.5 37.0 100 41.5 16.2 42.3 100 78.9 4.7 16.4 100
Quantity of numeraire
y¯0× 2 51.7 12.4 35.8 100 42.3 15.8 41.9 100 80.4 4.3 15.2 100
y¯0 /2 50.7 12.5 36.8 100 35.9 16.9 47.2 100 80.3 4.4 15.4 100
Marginal utility of search good
Φ = 1.2 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.9 15.8 42.3 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
Φ = 1.1 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.9 15.8 42.3 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
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6 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a simplified structure of complex economies with imperfect credit, labor,
and goods markets. We have shown how to solve them in the steady state with a rich structure
of bargaining over prices, wages, and financial repayment, and in the presence of turnover rates
specific to each phase of the firm, thus generalizing our previous approach (Petrosky-Nadeau and
Wasmer (2015)). We then apply this model by calibrating it to three European economies.
We find that, for these countries, goods and credit market frictions are a dominant share of
entry costs. They deserve much more attention in the quantitative macroeconomic literature, a
point similar to that in Pissarides (2009) where noncyclical entry costs were shown to considerably
improve the fit of the search and matching model to US data. We also find that demand side eﬀects,
through individual income shocks that aﬀect the demand for goods, are not extremely important,
although positive. They account for at most 15 to 25% of the eﬀect of job destruction shocks on
aggregate labor market tightness. We finally find that the speed of matching in the goods market
and the credit market represent small margins of improvement in the level of unemployment. Most
of the improvement comes from the speed of matching in the labor market.
The general conclusion is that the benchmark matching model in the labor market is a good
approximation of the first-order determinants of unemployment, even though it necessarily misses
the main component of firms’ entry costs. Richer models of the CLG type considerably improve
our quantitative understanding of the labor market equilibrium.
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Appendix
A Demand and supply of numeraire
The unemployed can transform part or all their leisure endowment z into additional production of the
numeraire. This fixes the demand and supply of the numeraire. Denote by dz this fraction transformed
into numeraire, where d might be smaller or larger than 1 (in the latter case the unemployed would enjoy
negative leisure, that is exert more eﬀort than the employed workers). They therefore supply zd+ y¯0 units
of good 0, and receive in turn a flow utility v(0, y¯0 + zd, z(1− d)). Under the additional assumption that
leisure and consumption of good 0 are additively separable in the utility function, the value of d is irrelevant
hereafter in the utility of the unemployed. However, as shown below, this value matters to equalize the
demand and supply of numeraire.
Since it is assumed there is no saving or pooling of income across individuals, a consumer not matched
with a search good spends his disposable income denoted by w on the numeraire. Thus c0U = w + y¯
0.
Matched consumers must sacrifice some consumption of the essential good in order to buy the search good.
Thus the consumption of good 0 of a matched consumer is c0M = c
0
U − Px = y¯0 + w − Px.
We denote by C1 = xDM the aggregate consumption of search goods 1. The aggregate consumption
of good 0 is given by
C0 = (U +DU ) y¯0 +DUw +DM
(
y¯0 + w − Px) .
It is the sum of individual consumption of the unemployed, of the unmatched consumers, and of the
matched consumers. The above equation implies that the supply of numeraire zdU+ y¯0 equals its demand.
Using U +DU +DM = 1, the equality implies DUw +DM (w − Px) = zdU or equivalently
Nw −DMPx = zdU .
This equation states that the revenue from firms net of expenses into the search good are spent into
the supplementary numeraire provided by the transformation of leisure of the unemployed. Therefore, d
adjusts here to equalize demand and supply of numeraire. It is important to note that, once the fraction
d of leisure transformed into numeraire to equalize demand and supply is determined, its value disappears
from the rest of the model. Only z will aﬀect the equilibrium wages and therefore labor market tightness.
B The general entry equation
We have the fundamental Bellman equations:
rEc = −κI + p(φ)(Ev − Ec) (40)
rEv = −γ + γ + q(Eg − Ev) + sCv(Ec − Ev) (41)
rEg = −wg + wg + λ(Eπ − Eg) + sCg(Ec − Eg) + sLg(Ev − Eg) (42)
rEπ = xP − wπ − ψ + sCπ(Ec − Eπ) + sG(Eg − Eπ) + sLπ(Ev − Eπ) (43)
and
rBc = −κB + φp(φ)(Bv −Bc) (44)
rBv = −γ + q(Bg −Bv) + sCv(Bc −Bv) (45)
rBg = −wg + λ(Bπ −Bg) + sCg(Bc −Bg) + sLg(Bv −Bg) (46)
rBπ = ψ + s
Cπ(Bc −Bπ) + sG(Bg −Bπ) + sLπ(Bv −Bπ) (47)
Summing up two-by-two, one obtains the value in the text:
(r + sCv)Jv = −γ + q(θ) (Jg − Jv) (48)
(r + sCg)Jg = −wg + sLg (Jv − Jg) + λ (Jπ − Jg) (49)
(r + sCπ)Jπ = xP − wπ + sLπ (Jv − Jπ) + sG (Jg − Jπ) (50)
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Two convenient notations can be introduced: let
Qg =
λ
r + sLg + sCg + λ
; Qπ =
sG
r + sLπ + sCπ + sG
which allows to rewrite equations (49) and (50) as:
Jg =
(
sLgK − wg
λ
+ Jπ
)
Qg (51)
Jπ =
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
+ Jg
)
Qπ. (52)
Solutions follow: one has then
Jg =
[
sLgK − wg
λ
+
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
+ Jg
)
Qπ
]
Qg (53)
Jπ =
[
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
+
(
sLgK − wg
λ
+ Jπ
)
Qg
]
Qπ (54)
or after simplification:
Jg =
Qg
1−QπQg
[
sLgK − wg
λ
+
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
)
Qπ
]
(55)
Jπ =
Qπ
1−QπQg
[
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
+
(
sLgK − wg
λ
)
Qg
]
. (56)
Equation (48) combined with free-entry Jv = K immediately delivers:
(
1 +
r + sCv
q
)
K +
γ
q
= Jg (57)(
1 +
r + sCv
q
)
K +
γ
q
=
Qg
1−QπQg
[
sLgK − wg
λ
+
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
)
Qπ
]
. (58)
Equation (58) can be rewritten by putting entry costs including early wages wg on the left-hand side and
rearranging it, so as to have:
(
1 +
r + sCv
q
)
K +
γ
q
+ Qg1−QπQg
(
wg−s
LgK
λ
)
=
QgQπ
1−QπQg
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
)
(59)
or
(
1 +
r + sCv
q
)
K +
γ
q
+ 11−QπQg
(
wg−s
LgK
r+sLg+sCg+λ
)
=
Qg
1−QπQg
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
r + sLπ + sCπ + sG
)
(60)
or finally K +Qv
γ
q
+ QvQg1−QπQg
(
wg−s
LgK
λ
)
=
QvQgQπ
1−QπQg
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
)
(61)
with (62)
Qg =
λ
r + sLg + sCg + λ
; Qπ =
sG
r+sLπ+sCπ+sG ; Qv =
q
r + sCv + q
. (63)
C Stock-flow equations in the extensive margin CLG model
In this part, we assume from the start the existence of credit shocks leading to the destruction of the firm
in stages g and π. The stock of firms in stage π receives the matches created in the goods market λNg
and loses the firms in stage π, losing their workers sLπNπ , the consumers quitting the good sGNπ and
finally the firms destroyed by credit shocks sCDM . The stock of firms in stage g receives the hirings ML
27
and the firms losing their clients sGNπ , and loses the matches created in the goods market λNg and loses
the firms in stage g losing their workers sLgNg as well as those hit by a credit shock sCgNg.
The stock of matched consumers receives the matches created in the goods market λˇDU , loses the
matched consumers who lost their job sLg,πDM which occurs either with probability sLg or sLπ depending
on whether the consumer is himself/herself in a firm in stage g or π selling (hence the compact notation
sLg,π = sLgNg+sLπNπ/(Ng+Nπ) for the expected turnover rate in stage g) and loses the consumers whose
firm lost their worker sLDM =
(
sG − τ)DM ; and loses the consumers who changed taste τDM . The stock
of unmatched consumers loses the matches created in the goods market λˇDU , gains the matches created in
the labor market ML, gains the consumers whose firm lost their worker sLDM and loses the unmatched
consumers who lost their job sLg,πDU and gains the consumers who changed taste τDM . Finally, the pool
of unemployed workers loses the matches creates in the labor marketML, gains the job losses sLg,π(1−U)
which arise, from the firm side, from firms in stage π losing their workers sLNπ and firms in stage g losing
their workers sLNg; or from matched consumers losing their job sLDM or from unmatched consumers
losing their job sLDU :
∂Nπ
∂t
= λNg︸︷︷︸
matches G
− sLπNπ︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss workers
− sGπNπ︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss customer
− sCπNπ︸ ︷︷ ︸
credit shock
(64)
∂Ng
∂t
= ML(U ,V)︸ ︷︷ ︸
matches L
+ sGNπ︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss customer
− λNg︸︷︷︸
matches G
− sLgNg︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss workers
− sCgNg︸ ︷︷ ︸
credit shock
(65)
∂DM
∂t
= λˇDU︸︷︷︸
matches G
− sLπDM︸ ︷︷ ︸
seller looses worker
− sCπDM︸ ︷︷ ︸
seller hit by a credit shock
− sLg,πDM︸ ︷︷ ︸
matched consumer loses job
− τDM︸ ︷︷ ︸
matched consumer changes tastes
(66)
∂DU
∂t
= −λˇDU︸ ︷︷ ︸
matches G
+ τDM︸ ︷︷ ︸
matched consumer changed tastes
+ ML(U ,V)︸ ︷︷ ︸
matches L
+ sLπDM︸ ︷︷ ︸
seller looses worker
+ sCπDM︸ ︷︷ ︸
seller hit by a credit shock
− sLg,πDU︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched consumer loses job
(67)
∂U
∂t
= −ML(U ,V) +
(
sLg,π + sCg,π
)
(1− U) = −ML(U ,V) + (sLπ + sCπ) (N π +Ng)
= −ML(U ,V) +
(
sLg,π + sCg,π
)
(DM +DU ) (68)
One can easily verify that ∂Nπ/∂t+ ∂Ng/∂t+ ∂U/∂t = 0 and that ∂DM/∂t + ∂DU/∂t+ ∂U/∂t = 0
at the same time.
D Price determination in CLG
Start from
(r + sCπ)Jπ = xP − wπ + sLπ (Jv − Jπ) + sG (Jg − Jπ)
rWn1 = (Φ− P)x+ y¯0 + sG(Wn0 −Wn1) + (sLπ + sCπ)(Wu −Wn1)
and
rWn0 = y¯0 + wg + λ(Wn1 −Wn0) + (sLπ + sCπ)(Wu −Wn0)
(r + sCg + sLg)Jg = −wg + sLgK + λ (Jπ − Jg) .
Note that we needed here sLπ = sLg otherwise two types of consumers. This leads to the firm’s and
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consumer’s consumption surpluses:
(r + sCπ + sLπ + sG)(Jπ − Jg) = xP − wπ + sLπK − Jg
(
r + sCπ + sLπ
)
= xP − wπ + sLπK −
(−wg + sLgK + λ (Jπ − Jg))
(r + sCπ + sLπ + sG)(Wn1 −Wn0) = (Φ− P)x+ y¯0 + (sLπ + sCπ)(Wu −Wn0)− rWn0
= (Φ− P)x+ y¯0 + (sLπ + sCπ)(Wu −Wn0)−
(
y¯0 + λ(Wn1 −Wn0) + (sLπ + sCπ)(Wu −W
= (Φ− P)x− λ(Wn1 −Wn0).
Bargaining over prices thus leads to, through (Wn1 −Wn0)(1 − αG) = (Jπ − Jg)αG:
αG
[
xP − wπ + sLπK −
(−wg + sLgK + λ (Jπ − Jg))] = (1− αG) [(Φ− P)x− λ(Wn1 −Wn0)]
and finally leads to:
Px = (1− αG)Φx+ αG
[
wπ − wg − sLπK + sLgK
]
.
In the special case where wages are identical (see below), the price converges to a constant of parameters,
Px = (1− αG)Φx+ αG(sLg − sLπ)K
which is even further simplified when labor turnover is the same in both stages g and π.
Px = (1− αG)Φx.
E Wage determination in stage g of CLG
Assume that the wage remains constant between stages g and π and utility is linear. The labor surpluses
of workers and bargaining firms are
(r + sLg + sCg) (Wn0 −Wu) = y¯0 + wg + λ (Wn1 −Wn0)− rWu
(r + sCg + sLg) (Jg − Jv) = 0− wg + λ (Jπ − Jg)− (r + sCg)K
with
rWu = y¯0 + f(Wn0 −Wu).
The capital gain of the worker when (s)he accesses consumption good 1 Wn1 −Wn0 is independent of wg.
The same is true from the capital gain of the firm Jπ − Jg. The maximization of the Nash product in the
labor market therefore leads to: (1 − αL)(Wn0 −Wu) = αL(Jg − Jv) leading to:
(1− αL) [y¯0 + wg + λ (Wn1 −Wn0)− rWu] = αL
[−wg + λ (Jπ − Jg)− (r + sCg)K]
⇔ wg = αL
[
0− (r + sCg)K]+ (1 − αL)(rWu − y¯0)
+ λαL (Jπ − Jg)− (1− αL)λ (Wn1 −Wn0) .
Interestingly the latter term can be simplified using the price bargaining equation, which holds in expec-
tation and in equilibrium, delivering the wage equation:
wg = (1− αL)(rWu − y¯0) + αL
[−(r + sCg)K]
+ λ (Jπ − Jg) αL − αG
1− αG
One can also replace the surplus of the firm by its forward value, using again
Jg =
Qg
1−QπQg
[(
sLgK − wg
λ
)
+
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
)
Qπ
]
(69)
Jπ =
Qπ
1−QπQg
[(
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
)
+
(
sLgK − wg
λ
)
Qg
]
(70)
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one has:
Jπ − Jg = 1
1−QπQg
[
Qπ
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
)
+
(
sLgK − wg
λ
)
QgQπ −Qg s
LgK − wg
λ
−
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
)
QπQg
]
=
1
1−QπQg
[
[1−Qg]
(
xP − wπ + sLπK
sG
)
+
(
sLgK − wg
λ
)
[QgQπ −Qg]
]
=
1
1−QπQg
[
xP − wπ + sLπK
r + sLπ + sCπ + sG
r + sLg + sCg
r + sLg + sCg + λ
− s
LgK − wg
r + sLg + sCg + λ
r + sLπ + sCπ
r + sLπ + sCπ + sG
]
.
Note that
1
1−QπQg =
1
1− λ
r+sLg+sCg+λ
sG
r+sLπ+sCπ+sG
=
(r + sLg + sCg + λ)(r + sLπ + sCπ + sG)
(r + sLg + sCg + λ)(r + sLπ + sCπ + sG)− λsG
=
(r + sLg + sCg + λ)(r + sLπ + sCπ + sG)
(r + sLg + sCg)(r + sLπ + sCπ) + (r + sLg + sCg)sG + (r + sLπ + sCπ)λ
implying
Jπ − Jg = (xP − wπ + s
LπK)(r + sLg + sCg)− (sLgK − wg)(r + sLπ + sCπ)
(r + sLg + sCg)(r + sLπ + sCπ) + (r + sLg + sCg)sG + (r + sLπ + sCπ)λ
.
Simplifications arise when assuming identical turnover and credit shocks in each stage and finally with
equal wages, one has
Jπ − Jg = (xP − wπ + s
LK)− (sLK − wg)
r + sL + sC + sG + λ
=
xP − wπ + wg
r + sL + sC + sG + λ
=
xP
r + sL + sC + sG + λ
.
The wage equation thus becomes, using the notation Q′g =
λ
r+sL+sC+sG+λ :
wg = (1− αL)(rWu − y¯0) + αL − αG
1− αG Q
′
gxP − αL(r + sCg)K
= (1− αL)(rWu − y¯0) + (αL − αG)Q′gxΦ− αL(r + sCg)K.
The price was replaced by its equilibrium expression in the last line. We also have the following simpler
cases:
CLG with αL=αG ⇒wg = (1− αL)(rWu − y¯0)− αL(r + sCg)K
LG with K = 0⇒wg = (1− αL)(rWu − y¯0) + (αL − αG)Q′gxΦ
CL with λ→∞,αG=0⇒wg = (1− αL)(rWu − y¯0) + αL
[
xP − (r + sCg)K]
L with K = 0,λ→∞,αG=0⇒wg = (1− αL)(rWu − y¯0) + αLPx.
One can finally use the usual simplification of the value of unemployment to obtain the equations from the
text.
rWu = z + y¯
0 +
αL
1− αL f(θ)Jg = z + y¯
0 +
αL
1− αLγθ.
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F Alternative timing for wages and price determination
Assume first that wages are diﬀerent across states g and π. The goods-market wage is still determined by:
wg = argmax
(
(Wg0 −Wu)αL(Jg − Jv)1−αL
)
. (71)
In regards to wage wπ, three diﬀerent timings can be explored (see Brzustowski (2015) for details).
• Timing 1 (wage wπ negotiated before price): After wg is determined, and before having met
a customer, the worker and the firm agree on a wage increase wπ −wg which will take eﬀect as soon
as the firm starts making profits. The new wage is the outcome of Nash-bargaining in anticipation
of the later meeting of a customer.
• Timing 2 (price negotiated before wage wπ): Instead, this is only once his/her firm has started
making profits by having met the customer that the worker renegotiates his/her wage and obtains a
bonus wπ − wg .
• Timing 3 (trilateral bargaining over wπ and price): When a match is formed on the goods
market, the customer, the firm’s manager, and the worker of the firm gather and the three of them
negotiate together over the price and the new wage.
In what follows, the outcomes of these three timings are presented independently after some preliminary
results proved in Brzustowski (2015). Define the surplus of the consumer upon matching with a good:
Wπ1 −Wπ0 = Wg1 −Wg0 ≡ SWM . (72)
Notice that equation (72) also implies that the surplus gained by the worker of a newly profitable firm does
not depend on his/her consumption situation:
Wπ1 −Wg1 = Wπ0 −Wg0 ≡ SWπ . (73)
One has:
SWM =
x(Φ− P)
r + sT + λ
(74)
SWπ =
wπ − wg
r + sT + λ
. (75)
These expressions are to be compared with the firm’s surplus upon matching on the goods market:
Jπ − Jg = xP − (wπ − wg)
r + sT + λ
. (76)
The goods market wage wg is independent of the future timing of negotiations. Indeed:
(
r + sC + sL + θq(θ)
)(
Wg0 −Wu
)
= wg − z + λ
(SWM + SWπ ) = wg − z +Q′g[x(Φ− P) + (wπ − wg)]
and using that Jv = K(φ), one has:
(
r + sC + sL + θq(θ)
)(
Jg − Jv
)
= −wg + γθ − (1− θ)(r + sC)K(φ) +Q′g
[
xP − (wπ − wg)
]
.
As a result, independently of P and wπ, it is always the case that:
∂(Jg − Jv)
∂wg
= −∂(WgU −Wu)
∂wg
.
It follows that the simple sharing rule in the main text will always hold:
wg = (1− αL)z + αL
(
γθ − (1− θ)(r + sC)K(φ)
)
+Q′g
[
xP − (wπ − wg)− (1− αL)xΦ
]
. (77)
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Timing 1 In this case, the new wage wπ is set before the price P . We denote by απL the bargaining
weight of workers in that stage, to distinguish it from the above bargaining weight in stage g αL. Reason
by backward induction and derive first the price. Everything else having already been set, Nash-bargaining
over the price leads to a simple sharing rule, with αG the bargaining power of the consumer:
(1 − αG)SWM = αG(Jπ − Jg).
Using equations (74) and (76), this yields:
P = (1− αG)Φ+ αGwπ − wg
x
. (78)
Then the new wage wπ can be derived. It is interpreted as an incentive to do a good job, which means
that the worker’s outside option in the negotiation is to do a “bad” job and let the firm remain in stage g.
As a result, the new wage is set as:
wπ = argmax
((SWπ )απL(Jπ − Jg)1−απL
)
.
Taking into account the price rule (78), one has:
∂(Jπ − Jg)
∂wπ
= −(1− αG)∂S
W
π
∂wπ
.
Hence
απL(Jπ − Jg) = (1− απL)(1− αG)SWπ .
Finally, one obtains:
απLP =
(
1− αG(1 − απL)
)wπ − wg
x
. (79)
The system formed by equations (78) and (79) can be solved to:
wπ − wg
x
= απLΦ (80)
P =
(
1− αG(1− απL)
)
Φ. (81)
In this case, the goods-market wage wg has the following expression:
wg = (1− αL)z + αL
(
γθ − (1 − θ)(r + sC)K(φ)
)
+Q′g
(
αL − αG − απL(1− αG)
)
xΦ. (82)
Timing 2 In this case, the new wage wπ is set after the price P . It is assumed for simplicity that the
worker’s outside option in this negotiation is to make the firm remain in stage g. This corresponds to the
case of a strike: the worker refuses to serve the customer as long as (s)he has not gotten a wage increase.
It could also be assumed that, rather than going on strike, the worker threatens to resign. However, this
would lead to more complicated results. The derivation of the results under timing 2 follows a very similar
structure to timing 1 and is left to the reader, who will obtain:
Bonus rule:
wπ − wg
x
= απLP . (83)
Price rule: (
1− απL(1− αG)
)
P = (1− αG)(1 − απL)Φ+ αG
wπ − wg
x
. (84)
The system formed by equations (83) and (84) can be solved to:
wπ − wg
x
= (1− αG)απLΦ (85)
P = (1− αG)Φ. (86)
In this case, the goods-market wage wg has the following expression:
wg = (1− αL)z + αL
(
γθ − (1 − θ)(r + sC)K(φ)
)
+Q′g
(
αL − αG − απL(1− αG)
)
xΦ. (87)
This is exactly the same expression as in timing 1.
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Timing 3 In this case, wπ and P are set simultaneously as the outcomes of a three-party Nash-bargaining:
(wπ ,P) = argmax
[(SWM )αG(SWπ )απL(Jπ − Jg)1−αG−απL
]
.
The solution couple (wπ ,P) will thus verify:
(1 − αG − απL)SWM = αG(Jπ − Jg)
(1 − αG − απL)SWπ = απL(Jπ − Jg).
It follows that the bonus-rule/price-rule system takes the form:
(1− απL)P = (1 − αG − απL)Φ+ αG
wπ − wg
x
(88)
απLP = (1 − αG)
wπ − wg
x
. (89)
This solves to:
wπ − wg
x
= απLΦ. (90)
P = (1− αG)Φ. (91)
In this case, the goods-market wage wg has the following expression
5:
wg = (1− αL)z + αL
(
γθ − (1− θ)(r + sC)K(φ)
)
+Q′g
(
αL − αG − απL
)
xΦ. (92)
.
G Calibration Appendix: Source of data
G.1 Credit Market Parameters
The discount rate r is taken homogenous across countries at 0.0033, which corresponds to an annual 4%
rate (US T-bill). Eurostat’s Business demography by size class [bd_9bd_sz_cl_r2] provides annual data
on Employment share of enterprise deaths for Business economy except activities of holding companies.
Dividing the data by 12, we obtain the model’s credit separation rate sC . Eurostat provides data for the
period 2008-2011. Given the small variations over that period, sC is taken constant between 2005 and
2014, equal to the average of the data provided by Eurostat for each country. In the absence of information
on the creditor’s bargaining power αC , it is set to 0.5.
Our main target on credit markets is the financial sector’s share in GDP, denoted Σ. In the model, the
GDP is y¯0 + xPNπ − γV − κBBc, and therefore:
Σ =
ψNπ − wNg − γV − κBBc
y¯0 + xPNπ − γV − κBBc .
Data are found in Eurostat’s table National Accounts aggregates by industry [nama_10_a64], from which
we take half of the value corresponding to financial activities. That is we have assumed that credit services
to households and to businesses yield tantamount revenues.
Finally, in the absence of further evidence, we target an average six months to find credit for an
entrepreneur in 2005. The credit matching factor χC is then fixed and this target is relaxed for the 2014
calibration. Similarly, it is assumed that the searching costs κB and κI are equal in 2005; κI being then
fixed and κB relaxed.
5Bear in mind that αG and βL have been defined diﬀerently in this case.
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G.2 Labor Market Parameters
We target the unemployment rate U supplied by Eurostat [une_rt_m] for each country. We follow Shimer
(2005)’s method and use Eurostat’s Unemployment by duration of unemployment - quarterly data from the
Labour Force Survey [lfsq_ugad], from which we obtain quarterly values for the short-term unemployment
rate (i.e. the rate of unemployed persons who have been unemployed for less than one month), denoted
U<1. Shimer (2005) uses it to estimate the job separation rate, sC + sL in our model. Instead, we prefer
to estimate a target for the job finding rate f , and to let sL be computed by the system. We consider then
the rate of persons unemployed for more than one month U>1 = U − U<1. In the model:
U>1t = (1− ft−1)Ut−1.
We have quarterly values for U>1 and monthly values for U . Hence values for f at the middle of each
quarter can be computed. The annual averages give us a target for f for each year. We target the job
vacancy rate V given by Eurostat’s Job vacancy statistics [jvs_q_nace2].
We target the share of wages in GDP Wgdp = (1−U)wy¯0+xPNπ−γV−κBBc to correspond to the values found
in Eurostat’s GDP and main components (output, expenditure, and income) [namq_10_gdp], which gives
quarterly data over 2005-2014 on the compensation of employees ’ share, taking into account wages and
salaries as well as employers’ social contributions. Data on unemployment benefit expenditures as a
percentage of GDP are provided by Eurostat [spr_exp_gdp] from which we can estimate the ratio z/w for
2005. Unemployment benefits z are then fixed for the 2014 calibration. Finally, we target Silva and Toledo
(2009)’s estimation that recruiting costs amount to 3.6% of a monthly wage. The vacancy posting cost γ
is then set constant for 2014.
G.3 Goods Market Parameters
The marginal utility of consuming the frictional good Φ and the pure taste shock rate τ are taken as
constant across countries and set as in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015). The quantity of numeraire
in the economy y¯0 is set to 1/12, such that individuals receive one unit of numéraire per year. The rate of
capacity utilization is, in the steady state, equal to:
µG(ξ) =
λ(ξ)
sG + sLg,π + λ(ξ)
and the corresponding numbers are provided by Eurostat [ei_bsin_q_r2]. We target the share of the
numeraire in total expenditures N taken from Eurostat’s Final consumption expenditure of households by
consumption purpose (COICOP 3 digit) [nama_10_co3_p3]. The numeraire is assumed to correspond to
the following categories (COICOP):
• Food and non-alcoholic beverages
• Alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and narcotics
• Water supply and miscellaneous services relating to the dwelling
• Electricity, gas, and other fuels
• Hospital services
• Operation of personal transport equipment
• Transport services
• Postal services
• Education
• Personal care
• Social protection
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G.4 Supplementary tables
G.4.1 Benchmark case
Table A.1 provides the equilibrium value of endogenous variables for each country-year.
Variable Year UK SPA GER
Credit
available creditors Bc
2005 .025 .030 .020
2014 .025 .025 .034
entrepreneurs in stage c Nc
2005 .025 .030 .020
2014 .024 .024 .012
market tightness φ
2005 1.0 1.0 1.0
2014 .94 .98 .34
repayment ψ
2005 .058 .053 .044
2014 .051 .065 .037
Labor
unemployment rate U
2005 .048 .092 .110
2014 .062 .245 .050
vacancy rate V
2005 .022 .008 .032
2014 .023 .006 .029
market tightness θ
2005 .46 .09 .29
2014 .37 .02 .58
wage w
2005 .14 .12 .13
2014 .14 .13 .13
Goods
firms making profits Nπ
2005 .76 .73 .75
2014 .77 .57 .80
firms in stage g Ng
2005 .20 .18 .14
2014 .17 .18 .15
price P
2005 .21 .19 .18
2014 .20 .21 .17
gross domestic product GDP
2005 .23 .21 .21
2014 .22 .20 .21
Table A.1: Endogenous variables.
G.4.2 Robustness analysis
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Table A.2: Robustness of the decomposition in the limit case with only one type of friction
UK Germany Spain
Model: C L G Sum C L G Sum C L G Sum
Benchmark 50.8% 14.5% 48.0% 113.3% 40.9% 18.0% 51.7% 110.7% 80.3% 5.3% 36.3% 121.9%
Finance’s share in GDP
Σ*2 45.1% 15.5% 52.7% 113.3% 33.6% 19.8% 57.0% 110.4% 77.9% 5.9% 38.1% 121.9%
Σ/10 55.7% 13.5% 44.2% 113.4% 46.5% 16.6% 47.7% 110.9% 82.6% 4.7% 34.5% 121.8%
Credit-search costs
κB = 2κI 50.8% 14.5% 48.0% 113.3% 41.0% 18.0% 51.7% 110.7% 80.3% 5.3% 36.3% 121.9%
κB = κI/2 50.8% 14.5% 48.0% 113.3% 40.9% 18.1% 51.7% 110.7% 80.3% 5.3% 36.3% 121.9%
Credit finding rate
p ∗ 2 50.8% 14.5% 48.0% 113.3% 41.0% 18.0% 51.7% 110.7% 80.3% 5.3% 36.3% 121.9%
p/2 50.8% 14.5% 48.0% 113.3% 40.9% 18.1% 51.7% 110.7% 80.3% 5.3% 36.3% 121.9%
Creditor’s bargaining αC = 0.8 50.5% 14.5% 48.3% 113.3% 40.2% 17.9% 52.6% 110.7% 80.7% 5.1% 36.0% 121.8%
power αC = 0.2 49.6% 14.7% 49.0% 113.3% 40.6% 18.5% 51.7% 110.7% 78.7% 5.8% 37.4% 121.9%
Quantity of numeraire
y¯0 *2 50.9% 14.7% 47.8% 113.5% 41.3% 18.2% 51.2% 110.7% 80.3% 5.5% 36.3% 122.0%
y¯0 /2 49.9% 14.6% 48.8% 113.3% 35.1% 19.2% 56.0% 110.4% 80.2% 5.3% 36.4% 121.8%
Marginal utility Φ = 1.2 50.8% 14.5% 48.0% 113.3% 41.0% 18.0% 51.7% 110.7% 80.3% 5.3% 36.3% 121.9%
of search good Φ = 1.1 50.8% 14.5% 48.0% 113.3% 41.0% 18.0% 51.7% 110.7% 80.3% 5.3% 36.3% 121.9%
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